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Notes
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.: The
Supreme Court's Expansion of Trade Dress
Protection Under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts interpret section 43(a)1 of the Lanham Act 2 as entitling
the first manufacturer of a product to an unregistered trademark in
the trade dress of the product.3 Though trademarknarrowly refers
to the mark or symbol used by a manufacturer to distinguish his or
her product in the marketplace, trade dress broadly refers to the
1. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation
cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the
same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by
any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in
the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
In 1988 Congress amended the Lanham Act when it enacted the Trademark Law Revision Act ("TLRA"). Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3946. The effective date of the
TLRA was Nov. 16, 1989. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Because Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992), arose under section 43(a) of the
Act before Congress enacted the 1988 amendments, the Supreme Court based its decision
on the pre-1988 version of the Act. Therefore, all discussion of the Lanham Act in this
Note refers to the Statute as it existed before the 1988 amendments. Any reference to the
1988 amendments will be made only to support or refute judicial interpretations.
2. Trademark Act, ch. 540, §§ 1-45, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)).
3. See 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.13(5], at 2178 (1992) (noting that the federal courts are currently in agreement that section 43(a)
creates a federal cause of action for trademark and trade dress infringement claims);
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that

section 43(a) protects registered trademarks as well as unregistered nonfunctional, distinctive marks).
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overall image of a product.4 Because courts evaluate a product's
trade dress on the basis of its overall appearance rather than on the
basis of its individual components, 5 they have extended trade dress
protection to a broad spectrum of products and ideas. For example, courts have granted trade dress protection to a product's packaging and design, 6 a rock music group's performance style,7 a
television commercial's
theme,8 and even a computer program's
9
feel.
and
overall look
Although most courts have recognized that section 43(a) establishes a cause of action for unregistered trade dress infringement,
they have disagreed on what elements are needed to establish a
prima facie case. Most courts agree that the plaintiff must prove
(1) that the two competing products are similar enough to create a
likelihood of confusion among the consuming public 10 and (2) that
4. " 'Trade dress' involves the total image of a product and may include features such
as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales
techniques." John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir.
1983). On the other hand, the Lanham Act defines a trademark as: "Any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
5. Knorr-Nahrmittel A.G. v. Reese Finer Foods, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 787, 791 (D.N.J.
1988) (noting that a court should compare the total, overall appearance of the products,
and not focus on individual features to determine infringement of trade dress).
6. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that
while trade dress traditionally involved the packaging or labeling of a product, the term
now includes the shape and design of the product as well); see also Harlequin Enters. Ltd.
v. Gulf Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir. 198 1) (recognizing that the design of a
product itself may function as its packaging, thereby entitling the manufacturer to trade
dress protection for the appearance of the product).
7. See Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
"[t]he trade dress of the band Revolver was the performance.... The ensemble of the
instruments, the stage setting, outfits, song list, delivery, character interpretation, and
choreography of the audience participation"). But cf.Hughes v. Design Look, Inc., 693
F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying trade dress protection for the style of
Andy Warhol paintings); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a competitor cannot have exclusive trade dress rights in the mere method
and style of doing business).
8. Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671,
680-82 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that copyright and trade dress infringement claims
could exist for copying the style and format of a television commercial).
9. Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.
La. 1991).
10. The Eighth Circuit established the current "likelihood of confusion" test which
considers the following factors:
(1) the strength of the owner's mark; (2) the similarity between the owner's
mark and alleged infringer's mark; (3) the degree to which the products compete with each other; (4) the alleged infringer's intent to "pass off" its goods as
those of the trademark owner; (5) incidents of actual confusion; and (6) the type
of product, its cost, and conditions of purchase.
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the appropriated features of the allegedly copied product are nonfunctional.Il Courts disagree, however, on whether a plaintiff must
also prove that the trade dress has acquired "secondary meaning"
to bring a claim.
Secondary meaning is a buyer's mental association between a
trademark or trade dress and the source of the product. 2 For example, the word strong has acquired a secondary meaning if, after
an enterprise names its brand of coffee "Strong Coffee," coffee consumers who see the word strong on a coffee container identify the
word with the enterprise as well as with strong-flavored coffee in
general.
The majority of circuit courts of appeals have held that proof of
secondary meaning is "superfluous" when a trade dress is "inherently distinctive,"' 13 because the trade dress alone is capable of
identifying the source of the product. 14 However, recognizing the
Co-Rect Products, Inc. v. Marvy! Advertising Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330
(8th Cir. 1985) (citing Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980)).
11. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1986); republished,
812 F.2d 1531 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (to reflect correct appearances of counsel), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (holding that six-pack trays with plastic overwrap for ice cream
bars constitute functional packaging); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536
F.2d 1210, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (noting that functionality
refers to whether a particular product feature connotes any purpose other than serving as
a trademark). But cf New England Butt Co. v. International Trade Comm'n., 756 F.2d
874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the overall shape of a product or container must
be nonfunctional in order to receive trademark protection).
12. See, e.g., Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982)
(holding that in order "[t]o establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that,
in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself"); AmBrit, 812 F.2d at
1536 n.14 (defining secondary meaning as "the connection in the consumer's mind between the mark and the product's producer, whether that producer is known or
unknown").
13. An inherently distinctive mark is any term that is fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive
and, therefore, under trademark law does not require secondary meaning for legal protection. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:2, at
346 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter MCCARTHY]. For a more detailed explanation of inherently distinctive marks, see infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
14. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1075 (1990) (holding that "infringement of trade dress is proven if: (1) plaintiff's
trade dress is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, (2) plaintiff's
trade dress is primarily nonfunctional, and (3) the defendant's trade dress is confusingly
similar"); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988) (holding that a product's trade dress is eligible for protection under the Lanham Act "if it is so distinctive as to become, in effect, an unregistered trademark"); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th
Cir. 1987) (noting that if "trade dress is inherently distinctive, the further requirement of
a showing of secondary meaning should be superfluous"); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S.
Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that secondary meaning is not
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distinction between unregistered trademarks and trade dress, some
circuit courts have required proof of secondary meaning in all
cases, regardless of whether the trade dress is inherently
distinctive. 15
The conflict regarding whether a plaintiff must prove that his or
her inherently distinctive trade dress has acquired secondary
meaning in the marketplace has been resolved by the Supreme
Court in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,Inc. 16 In Two Pesos, the
Court held that a plaintiff need not prove that his or her unregistered trade dress possesses secondary meaning in order to bring a
cause of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.17 Instead,
the Court determined that an inherently distinctive trade dress is
protected under the Lanham Act without the additional proof that
it has acquired a secondary meaning."8
This Note analyzes the legal and economic implications of the
Two Pesos decision. First, it considers the history and judicial interpretation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 9 Next, it analyzes the Supreme Court's current construction of trade dress
protection under the Act, as set forth in Two Pesos." This Note
then reviews the remaining barriers to protection under the Act
after the Two Pesos decision. 2' Finally, this Note examines
whether the test provided in Two Pesos will affect competition and
other areas of intellectual property law.22
II. BACKGROUND

A review of the background of trade dress protection begins with
a review of the development of trademark law. This section will
explore the history of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. It will
required "if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark"); AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537
(holding that an ice cream bar wrapper may be inherently distinctive).
15. See, e.g., Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 281 (1991) (holding that, among other requirements, trade dress is protected if it "has
acquired secondary meaning"); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative
House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the motion
picture "Oscar" award had acquired secondary meaning so that it was entitled to protection under the Lanham Act); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp. 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that a "plaintiff's trade dress may be protected if it is nonfunctional
and if it has acquired secondary meaning").
16. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
17. Id. at 2761.
18. Id.
19. See infra part II.
20. See infra part III.
21. See infra part IV.
22. See infra part V.
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then look at judicial interpretations of the Act. Specifically, it will
review decisions from the Fifth and Second Circuits, which most
adequately represent the divergent views courts have taken in interpreting section 43(a).
A.

The Common Law Bases for Trademark and Trade Dress
Protection

Before the enactment of the Lanham Act, trade dress protection
existed primarily under state common law doctrines of unfair competition.2 3 Since the adoption of the Lanham Act in 1946, however, federal4 law has provided the primary means of trade dress
2
protection.
Courts generally define trademarks as the embodiment of a
firm's goodwill. 25 Goodwill is intangible and represents the value
of a business beyond its physical assets; 26 it reflects the favorable
consideration consumers give to products or services coming from
a particular source, and it is carefully developed by enterprises to
give them a competitive edge in the market place. 27 For example,
consumers rely on a product's brand name or distinctive packaging
when making a purchasing decision.28 A successful trademark is
valuable to producers and consumers alike because it may lower
consumer search costs and, at the same time, provide an incentive
for producers to maintain high quality standards. 29 Recognizing
the benefits provided by trademark protection, Congress enacted
the Lanham Act to prevent unfair competition and to protect a
product's goodwill.3 °
23. IA RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 5.04, at 30 (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
CALLMANN].
24. The United States Trademark Association has remarked that "[t]oday the Lanham Act is the paramount source of trademark law in the United States, as interpreted
almost exclusively by the federal courts." The United States Trademark Association
Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and
Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 377 (1987) [hereinafter USTA Report].
25. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 806 (D. Del. 1920)
(defining a firm's trademark as "one of the visible mediums by which the good will is
identified, bought, and sold and known to the public").
26. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (6th ed. 1990).
27. Id. at 694.
28. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 761 (1990)
[hereinafter Carter] ("Trademarks... foster competition and the maintenance of quality
by securing to the producer the benefits of a good reputation.") (quoting Park and Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park 'N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
29. See id. at 762 (noting that from an economic standpoint, trademark protection
lowers consumer search costs and creates an incentive to maintain quality).
30. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.

Loyola University Law Journal

290

B

[Vol. 24

The History of Section 43(a)

The Lanham Act, which developed as a parallel to the common
law of unfair competition, codifies most if not all of the common
law principles.3" Most important, as commentators have suggested, section 43(a) has its roots in the common law tort of passing off, which developed as an offshoot of the torts of fraud and
deceit. 32 A passing off action focuses on whether the defendant
33
attempted or intended to pass off his goods for those of another
and whether his product had acquired secondary meaning.34
Although the Lanham Act deals primarily with the protection of
registered trademarks,35 section 43(a) specifically protects unregis1274, 1277 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1333] (noting that "the protection of trademarks is
merely protection to good will, to prevent diversion of trade through misrepresentation,
and the protection of the public against deception"); Eastern Wine Corp. v. WinslowWarren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) (holding that
"[t]he protection of such monopolies in names seems, then, to rest on the social interest in
protecting primarily, not the consumer, but the businessman who has gained a strategic
advantage through building up of good-will, against unfair practices by competitors who
desire to poach on that good will").
31. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 30, at 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1275:
There is no essential difference between trademark infringement and what is
loosely called unfair competition. Unfair competition is the genus of which
trademark infringement is one of the species ....
The Supreme Court has
noted that
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act ... creates a federal remedy for making 'a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same'
.... Congress has thus given federal recognition to many of the concerns that
underlie the state tort of unfair competition ....
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989).
32. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 5:2, at 133-35.
33. Id. at 133.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, which provides in part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) of this section,
the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the
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tered trademarks and trade dress. 36 Section 43(a) broadly proscribes both "false designations of origin" and "false descriptions of
37
goods."
C. JudicialInterpretation of Section 43(a)
Operating under the shadow of the common law, early interpretations of section 43(a) were generally conservative. 38 For example, courts limited actions under the "false designation of origin"
branch of section 43(a) to false advertising of geographic origin.39
Similarly, courts restricted actions for "false description or representation" of goods to false advertising and passing off.4° However, over the years courts have expanded these two categories,
recognizing section 43(a) as something more than the codification
of existing law .4 Today, courts focus on protecting the public
acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended
to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 114(1) (1988).
36. Id. § 1125(a); see, e.g., San Juan Prods. v. San Juan Pools of Kan., Inc., 849 F.2d
468, 474 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[t]he Lanham Act protects unregistered marks as
does the common law"); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1988) ("Federal courts have long held that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends protection to unregistered trademarks on the principle that unlicensed use of a designation
serving the function of a registered mark constitutes a false designation of origin and a
false description or representation."); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that section 43(a) "is the only
provision in the Lanham Act that protects an unregistered mark .... Its purpose is to
prevent consumer confusion regarding a product's source ... and to enable those that
fashion a product to differentiate it from others on the market") (citations omitted).
37. 15 U.S.C. § .1125(a) (1988); see also Inwood Lab, Inc., v. Ives Lab, Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 858 (1982) (noting that "section 43(a) prohibits a broader range of practices than
does section 32").
38. See e.g., Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77, 82-83 (2d
Cir. 1951) (holding that defendants who sold their own root beer, falsely representing it
to be that of the plaintiff's, were liable to the plaintiff for lost profits under section 43(a));
California Apparel Creators v. Weider of California, Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947) (holding that in order to recover under section 43(a), an
owner of trade dress must show that an infringer used the owner's trade dress in a false or
deceitful manner).
39. See, e.g., Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595, 598-99
(N.D. Ill. 1971) (holding that "[d]efendant's use of its 'House of Stuart Blended Scotch
Whiskey' label for spurious Scotch Whiskey including spirits not produced in Scotland
constitutes a false designation of geographic origin").
40. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951)
(The defendant attempted to pass off his story as being authored by Mark Twain).
41. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954),
finding
nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that...
section [43(a)] is merely declarative of existing law. . . . It seems to us that
Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in
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from confusingly similar marks rather than on the intent of defendants who misappropriate another's goods or marks.4 2 Thus, a
"false designation of origin" claim generally includes any representation with respect to the originator of a product.43 Similarly, a
"false description" of goods claim includes any untrue statement
pertaining to the nature of the goods.4
Although nothing in the text of section 43(a) supports these expansive readings,45 courts broadened the reach of the Act to remain consistent with the congressional purpose of protecting both
businesses and consumers. 46 When it revisited the statute, Congress acquiesced to judicial interpretation:47 in the 1988 amendments, Congress acknowledged that an action for a confusingly
commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured
by such wrong the right to relief in the federal courts.
42. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 5:2, at 133-34.
43. IA CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 5.04, at 31.
44. Id.
45. See Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby--Too Far Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84, 85 (1973)
(arguing that "the cases have applied Section 43(a) to situations it was not intended to
cover and have used it in ways that it was not designed to function").
46. The Senate Report that accompanied the passage of the statute addressed these
twin goals by stating:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks
for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent
energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected
in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the
well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark
owner.
S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 30, at 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274.
Thus, by protecting trademarks, Congress hoped "to protect the public from deceit, to
foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed." Id. at 1275.
47. See S. REP. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 100-515]:
The purpose of the revision is as follows "[t]o codify the interpretation it has
been given by the courts. Because § 43(a) of the Act fills an important gap in
federal unfair competition law, the committee expects the courts to continue to
interpret the section ....
As written, Section 43(a) appears to deal only with false descriptions or representations and false designations of geographic origin. Since its enactment in
1946, however, it has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal
law of unfair competition. For example, it has been applied to cases involving
the infringement of unregistered marks, violations of trade dress and certain
nonfunctional configurations of goods and actionable false advertising claims."
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similar trade dress did not require proof of falsity," and that section 43(a) applied to protect a product's unregistered trade dress.49
However, Congress failed to specify whether the principles used in
qualifying a mark for registration under section 2 of the Lanham
Act5 ° also apply to a section 43(a) action to protect an unregistered
mark or trade dress. Specifically, Congress did not address the
question of whether an unregistered trade dress requires proof of
secondary meaning before it is protected under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.
Because section 43(a) does not use the terms trade dress, trademark, or secondary meaning,5 an inherent difficulty arises in determining whether a cause of action under the Act requires proof of
secondary meaning. Thus, some courts, including the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 52 have interpreted
this congressional omission to mean that the same test that qualifies a trademark for registration also determines whether an unregistered trademark or trade dress is eligible for protection under
section 43(a). In other words, these courts will protect unregistered trademarks and trade dress if they are inherently distinctive
or if they have acquired a secondary meaning.
Other courts, most notably the Second Circuit, have taken a
contrary view.5 3 These courts hold that section 43(a) does not protect trade dress unless the claimant can show that his or her trade
dress has acquired secondary meaning.
48. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3946
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1989)). Congress broadened the language of
section 43(a) to make explicit that the provision prohibits "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof" that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person ......
49. See S. REP. No. 100-515, supra note 47, at 40, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N at
5603.
50. The general rule for qualifying a trademark for registration is, inter alia, that the
mark must be distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning. Park and Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park 'N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). A mark is distinctive if it either: (1) is
inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990) [herein-

after

RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION].

51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
52. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d
695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982) (holding that proof of secondary
meaning is not required to protect unregistered trade dress); see also supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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1. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation
In Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary PurchasingGroups, Chevron claimed that Voluntary Purchasing Groups had infringed on
its trade dress, in violation of section 43(a), by copying the packages that Chevron used for its lawn and garden products.54
Although Voluntary Purchasing Groups had deliberately copied
Chevron's packaging, the district court refused to grant relief
under the Lanham Act because it found that section 43(a) did not
provide a cause of action for trade dress infringement." In addition, the court found that Chevron failed to show either that its
trade dress had acquired secondary meaning or that consumers
were likely to confuse the sources of the two competing products6
Analyzing the criteria used by courts to extend protection to
trademarks, the Fifth Circuit recognized that courts have traditionally conferred protection to marks based upon their relative
distinctiveness.5 7 For example, in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc.," the Second Circuit stated that a protected
mark may be either: "(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4)
arbitrary, or (5) fanciful." 9 Traditionally, courts have not required proof of secondary meaning for marks that are suggestive,"
arbitrary, 61 or fanciful 62 because they are sufficiently "distinctive"
54. Chevron, 659 F.2d at 696.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 702.
58. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
59. Id. at 9.
60. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that "Citibank" is suggestive because the term, at most, suggests a modem or
urban bank); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that family of "At-A-Glance" marks for calendars were suggestive because they were suggestive of format, although not directly descriptive).
61. An arbitrary mark consists of a word, symbol or picture which has a commonly
understood meaning, but which, when used in conjunction with particular types of goods
or services, does not suggest or describe any aspect, quality or characteristic of those
goods or services. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 11:4, at 439; see, e.g., Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1941) (holding that "Arrow"
liqueurs is an arbitrary mark); Greyhound Corp. v. Rotham, 84 F. Supp. 233 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 175 F.2d 893 (1949) (holding that "Greyhound" is an arbitrary mark for a bus
line).
62. The term fanciful as a classifying concept in trademark law is usually applied to
words invented solely for their use as trademarks. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 11:3,
at 436; see, e.g., Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774 (7th Cir.
1927) (holding that "Cutex" cuticle-removing liquid is a fanciful mark); Clorox Chemical
Co. v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp., 25 F. Supp. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that "Clorox"
bleach is a fanciful mark).
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in themselves to identify the producer.63 In contrast, at common
law, neither generic terms 4 nor descriptive terms 65 could become
valid trademarks. However, the Lanham Act does afford protection to marks that are merely descriptive if the owner can prove
that the mark has acquired secondary meaning. 66 No such exception exists for generic marks. Thus, even proof of secondary meaning cannot qualify a generic mark for trademark registration.67
The Chevron court reasoned that just as there are an unlimited
number of nonfunctional words and symbols available for use by
late comers in the marketing of their products, the possible varieties of advertising display and packaging are also virtually endless. 68 Reasoning that the same principles that apply to protect
trademarks should also apply to protect trade dress, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court.
2. The Second Circuit's Interpretation
The Second Circuit has taken a contrary view in interpreting
Congress's failure to include trademark and trade dress protection
in section 43(a) as well as its failure to mention or define secondary
meaning in the Act.69 According to the Second Circuit, these
omissions indicate congressional intent to distinguish between protection of registered trade marks and trade dress and protection of
unregistered trademarks and trade dress.70 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, therefore, the Second Circuit did not look to trademark prin1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 11:2, at 435-36.
64. A generic term "refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of
which the particular product is a species." Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9; see, e.g.,
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. New York Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding that "air-shuttle" as used by Eastern Airlines for air service between New
York and Washington, D.C., and New York and Boston, is a generic term); Gear, Inc. v.
L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that "gear" is a generic
name for clothing).
65. See, e.g., Raco Car Wash Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 730 F. Supp. 695 (D.S.C. 1989)
(holding that "No Spot," as used for designating automatic car wash equipment, is
descriptive).
66. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938)
(holding that trademark protection is extended only when the user has proven secondary
meaning in a descriptive mark).
67. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 520.
68. Chevron, 659 F.2d at 703. But see Carter, supra note 28, at 760 (arguing that this
very basis upon which trademark law rests is flawed, and that the number of "good"
marks available for distinguishing one's product in the marketplace is limited).
69. See Vibrant Sales, Inc., v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 304. The primary distinction between registered and unregistered trademarks is that registration triggers certain substantive and procedural rights for the trademark holder. See San Juan Prods., Inc. v. San Juan Pools of Kan., Inc., 849 F.2d 468,
474 (10th Cir. 1988). For example, a registered trademark or trade dress enjoys a pre63.
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ciples to determine the appropriate standards to employ in
protecting an unregistered trade dress.
In Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc.,7 Vibrant, a
manufacturer and marketer of a waist-reducing belt, entered into a
joint venture with Maximum Exposure Advertising, Inc. (MEA) to
market Vibrant's belt nationwide.7 2 After Vibrant and MEA terminated the agreement, MEA began marketing its own belt
through a company called The New Body Boutique, Inc. This belt
resembled the belt that MEA had previously marketed during its
joint venture with Vibrant.73 Vibrant brought an action against
The New Body Boutique, alleging that it had violated the Lanham
Act and breached its contract.74
Reversing the district court's decision to grant Vibrant an injunction, the Second Circuit held that in order for a claimant to
invoke section 43(a) protection, he or she must show that an unregistered trademark or trade dress has acquired secondary meaning. 75 Because registered marks, unlike unregistered marks, enjoy
a presumption that they represent the source in the minds of the
public,76 the court reasoned that requiring proof of secondary
meaning "flows logically" from section 43(a), which is the only
provision in the Lanham Act not limited to registered marks.77
The Second Circuit concluded that this requirement was necessary
to remain consistent with the section 43(a) purpose of limiting
claims to instances in which unique or distinctive features associated with particular manufacturers have been copied.78
III.

THE Two PESOS DECISION

Due to the conflicting appellate court interpretations of section
43(a), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 79 in Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,Inc. to decide whether inherently distinctive trade dress that has not acquired secondary meaning may
nonetheless be protected under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
sumption of validity and puts other producers on notice that a particular mark is already
being used in the marketplace. Vibrant Sales, 652 F.2d at 303.
71. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 301.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 302.
75. Id. at 304.
76. Vibrant Sales, 652 F.2d at 304.
77. Id. at 303.
78. Id. at 303-04.
79. 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
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This section will first review the facts and lower court decisions in
Two Pesos and then discuss the Supreme Court's opinion.
A.

The Facts and the Lower Courts' Opinions

Taco Cabana and Two Pesos are competing chains of upscale
fast-food Mexican restaurants.8" In September 1978, Taco Cabana
opened its first restaurant in San Antonio, Texas, with what it
called its "Mexican Fast-Food Trade Dress."'8 By 1985, Taco Cabana operated six more restaurants, all in San Antonio. 2
In December 1985, Two Pesos opened its first restaurant in
Houston, adopting a motif similar to Taco Cabana's. a At the
time, Taco Cabana did not have any restaurants outside of San
Antonio. 84 Two Pesos expanded into Houston, Dallas/Fort Worth
and various cities outside of Texas. 5 Two Pesos did not, however,
enter San Antonio, where Taco Cabana was doing business.8 6
In 1987, Taco Cabana filed suit against Two Pesos in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for trade
dress infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.8 7 The
district court instructed the jury that Taco Cabana's trade dress 8
80. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2755 (1992).
81. Taco Cabana described its Mexican trade dress as:
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior
and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the
outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building
[has] a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes.
Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991).
82. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2755.
83. Id.
84. After filing this suit, Taco Cabana expanded into several cities, including Houston and Dallas where Two Pesos was already doing business. Brief for Petitioner at *5,
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753 (1992) (No. 91-971) (availablein
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. "Six days before this
action was filed, [the two brothers who owned Taco Cabana] entered into a series of
agreements to divide up the restaurants and go their separate ways," apparently as a
result of a disagreement regarding the proposed expansion of Taco Cabana into the markets where Two Pesos was doing business. Id. "Among the agreements was a trade dress
agreement." Id.
85. Between December 1985 and August 1988, Two Pesos opened 29 restaurants.
Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1117 n.2.
86. Id. at 1117.
87. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2756. Taco Cabana also filed a claim for theft of trade
secrets under Texas common law. Id. However, the United States Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari to the Lanham Act question only. Id. at 2757.
88. Id. at 2755. The District Court instructed the jury:
'Trade dress' is the total image of the business. Taco Cabana's trade dress may
include the shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the
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was protected if it was inherently distinctive or if it had acquired
secondary meaning. s9 Based on the jury's finding that Taco Cabana's trade dress had not acquired secondary meaning, but was
inherently distinctive, the district court entered judgment for and
awarded damages to Taco Cabana. 90
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Two Pesos objected to the district
court's instructions to the jury,9' claiming that a finding that the
trade dress had not obtained a secondary meaning contradicted a
finding that it was inherently distinctive. 92 Two Pesos argued that
the district court erred in failing to inform the jury that Taco Cabana's trade dress could be protected only if the jury found that it
identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the menu, the equipment used to serve food, the servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on
the total image of the restaurant.
Id. at 2755 n. 1.
89. Id. at 2756.
90. Id. Specifically, the jury found that: (1) Taco Cabana had a trade dress; (2) taken
as a whole, the trade dress was nonfunctional; (3) the trade dress was inherently distinctive; (4) the trade dress had not acquired a secondary meaning in the Texas market; and
(5) the alleged infringement created a likelihood of confusion on the part of ordinary
customers as to the source or association of the restaurant's goods or services. Id.
91. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1119. Two Pesos objected to the following portion of
the trial court's instructions:
The law allows the copying of functional features in the public interest of
enhancing competition ....

Even if the trade dress is made up of individual

elements, some of which serve a functionalpurpose, the trade dress may be protectable so long as the combination of these individual elements which define
Taco Cabana's trade dress taken is arbitrary. On the other hand, if you find
that Taco Cabana's trade dress taken as a whole must be used by others in order
to compete in the Mexican fast-food restaurant business, then you should find
that Plaintiff's trade dress is functional and not protectable.
[T]he inquiry into whether Taco Cabana's trade dress is functional or nonfunctional should not be addressed to whether individualelements fall within the
definition, but whether the whole collection of elements taken together arefunctional or non-functional.
Id. at 1118-19.
92. Id. at 1119-20. The petitioner also claimed that:
Taco Cabana's overall trade dress of a Mexican decor and a combination of
admittedly functional features, cannot rise to the level of a protectable trade
dress, subject to exclusive appropriation by a single commercial source in the
manner of a federally registered trademark, (i) because the Jury found it had no
secondary meaning, (ii) because the trade dress is simultaneously being used by
two separate and distinct Mexican restaurant chains-Taco Cabana and TaCasita-so that it does not identify a single commercial source, and (iii) because
the trade dress itself contains too many common and ordinary visual aspects,
which relate to functional, descriptive and generic features, in order for the
trade dress to have secondary meaning or be inherently distinctive ....
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 84, at *5-6. Petitioner argued that the case was tried as a
restaurant "concept" case, rather than a trade dress case and thus, relying on the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1986), it argued that
"business concepts" are not generally protectable. Id. at *6.
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had acquired secondary meaning. The Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court's jury instructions, finding that they reflected the current state of the law.9 3 In addition, the court concluded that the
evidence supported the jury's findings. 94 In its holding, the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Chevron and rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Vibrant Sales.95
B.

The Opinion of the Supreme Court

Two Pesos petitioned the United States Supreme Court for 96a
writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision and held
that because trade dress that is inherently distinctive is capable of
identifying products or services as issuing from a specific source, it
is protected under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without a further showing that the trade dress has acquired secondary
97
meaning.
Writing for the majority, 98 Justice White focused his analysis on
the statutory language of section 43(a). In particular, Justice
White noted that nothing in the text of the statute supported applying different standards to the protection of trademarks and
trade dress. 99 Justice White emphasized that section 43(a) mentions neither trademark nor trade dress and does not contain the
concept of secondary meaning.100 Rather, secondary meaning is
mentioned in the Lanham Act only as a requirement for protecting
merely descriptive marks, not inherently distinctive marks.101
93. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1119.
94. Id. The Court of Appeals found that Taco Cabana "can protect a combination of
visual elements that taken together .... may create a distinctive, visual impression." Id.
at 1118 (quoting Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842- 43 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
95. Id.
96. 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992). The Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari to the
question of whether secondary meaning is required to invoke section 43(a) protection for
unregistered trade dress. The Court did not grant certiorari on Petitioner's second question, which challenged the lower courts' finding that Taco Cabana's trade dress was not
functional and therefore not properly subject to imitation by other users. Id. For the
jury instructions regarding functional features, see supra note 91.
97. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761.
98. Id. at 2755. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter joined.
Justices Stevens and Thomas filed concurring opinions. Id. at 2761, 2766. For a discussion of the concurring opinions, see infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
99. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760 (stating that "[s]ection 43(a) provides no basis for
distinguishing between trademarks and trade dress").
100. Id.
101. Id.
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To determine the appropriate test for protecting unregistered
trade dress, the Court reviewed the congressional floor debates that
preceded the passage of the statute in 1946. The Court concluded
that protection of both trademarks and trade dress under section
43(a) furthered one of Congress's goals in passing the Lanham
Act-prevention of deception and unfair competition.' 0 2 In addition, the majority recognized that the inherently distinctive test
that normally applied to protect a registered trademark also applied to protect an unregistered trade dress.' 0 3 That is, the Act
protected a descriptive mark found to be inherently distinctive or a
mark that had acquired secondary meaning. 0 4
According to the Court, the same principles that qualify a mark
for registration under section 2 of the Lanham Act generally apply
when determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under section 43(a).10 5 Because of the lack of textual support in section 43(a) for treating inherently distinctive verbal or
symbolic trademarks differently from inherently distinctive trade
dress, the Court concluded that one need not prove that inherently
distinctive trade dress has obtained secondary meaning. 3 6 In
reaching its conclusion, the majority noted that the Second Circuit
view-that unregistered marks, unlike registered marks, do not enjoy a presumption that they represent their source-was in consid10 7
erable tension with the provisions of the Lanham Act.
Finally, the Court emphasized that policy reasons dictate finding
that section 43(a) does not require proof of secondary meaning
102. Id. at 2757 (stating that "[t]he Lanham Act was intended to make actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks and to protect persons engaged in... commerce
against unfair competition).
103. Id. at 2758.
104. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758 (citing RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,
supra note 50, § 13, at 37-38 & cmt. a).
105. Id. at 2757 (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 299 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1986); Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1985)).
106. Id. at 2760.
107. The Court stated:
If a verbal or symbolic mark or the features of a product design may be registered under § 2, it necessarily is a mark 'by which the goods of the applicant
may be distinguished from the goods of others,' 60 Stat. 428, and must be registered unless otherwise disqualified. Since § 2 requires secondary meaning only
as a condition to registering descriptive marks, there are plainly marks that are
registrable without showing secondary meaning. These same marks, even if not
registered, remain inherently capable of distinguishing the goods of the users of
these marks. Furthermore, the copier of such a mark may be seen as falsely
claiming that his products may for some reason be thought of as originating
from the plaintiff.
Id. at 2759.
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when a trade dress has been found to be inherently distinctive. According to the Court, requiring proof of secondary meaning would
impose substantial barriers to trade dress protection. 0 8 These barriers could lead to an influx of confusingly similar trade dress,
which would make it more difficult for consumers to identify a producer with its product. °9 This would undermine the underlying
purpose 0of the Lanham Act-to secure a mark's goodwill to its
owner.
In addition, the Court emphasized that a contrary holding could
cause anticompetitive effects by burdening small-business owners
in the start-up of their businesses."' Competitors of a suggestive,
fanciful,,or arbitrary trade dress developer are more apt to attempt
to appropriate the trade dress at the outset of its use, rather than
after the trade dress has been used in the market for a long period2
of time. This is likely to result in financial loss to the developer. "
Although the Court resolved the issue of whether secondary
meaning is required to protect inherently distinctive trade dress,
the majority nevertheless declined to address two crucial and related issues. Specifically, the majority declined to decide what
makes a product's trade dress distinctive and what amount of
copying is necessary to constitute infringement." 13 In addition, the
Court failed to limit its decision with respect to the variables of
time, scope, or geographical area.
C.

The Concurrences

In his concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that
108. Id.
109. Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2759.
110. Id.
111. The Court rejected petitioner's suggestion that in order to overcome this burden,
trade dress should receive limited protection at the outset without proof of secondary
meaning. The petitioner went on to argue that such protection should be only temporary
and subject to defeasance if, over time, the dress has failed to acquire a secondary meaning. Id. at 2757-61.
In addition, the Court denied that under its inherently distinctive test, the initial user
of any shape or design would cut off competition from products of like design and shape.
Under its test, only nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under section 43(a).
Id. at 2755.
112. Id. at 2759.
113. Although the majority commented on which types of marks are generally considered inherently distinctive, it failed to provide any guidelines for determining when a
trade dress that embodies a business's total image would qualify as being arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive. Thus, the Court failed to recognize that although it may be easy to
classify a mark under one of these categories, it is more difficult to classify "a combination of visual elements that, taken together, may create a distinctive visual impression."
See analysis infra part IV.
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both registered and unregistered trademarks and trade dress
should receive essentially the same protection.1 14 However,
although he emphasized that the federal courts had transformed
the meaning of the text of section 43(a) over the past few decades, " 5 Justice Stevens agreed with the judicial interpretation because it remained consistent with the statute's purpose and because
Congress had endorsed the change in the Trademark Revision Act
of 1988.116 Although Congress did not specifically address the
question of whether section 43(a) required secondary meaning, the
steps Congress had taken in this subsequent legislation suggested
to Justice Stevens that secondary meaning is not required if trade
17
dress is found to be inherently distinctive.'
In his brief concurrence, Justice Thomas also asserted that the
statutory language of section 43(a) supported the majority's holding." 8 He explained that because there are an infinite variety of
ways to package a product, a particular trade dress is now considered as fully capable of serving as a "representation or designation"
of source under section 43(a) as a particular trademark.' 19 Therefore, first users of distinctive trade dress, like first users of distinctive trademarks, should be entitled to the presumption that their
packaging and designs designate the source of their products. 12 0
IV.

ANALYSIS

While the Two Pesos decision settled the dispute over which test
courts should follow to determine whether unregistered trade dress
qualifies for protection under section 43(a), the opinion neither delineated the standards for determining when a product's trade
dress is inherently distinctive, nor set the parameters for applying
such a test. These omissions are significant since they are likely to
result in conflicting authority over which elements exist in an in114. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2761-62 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. Justice Stevens noted that the United States Trademark Association supported
the judicial expansion of section 43(a):
Section 43(a) is an enigma, but a very popular one. Narrowly drawn and intended to reach false designations or representations as to the geographical origin of products, the section has been widely interpreted to create, in essence, a
federal law of unfair competition.... It has definitely eliminated a gap in unfair
competition law, and its vitality is showing no signs of age.
Id. at 2763 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing USTA Report, supra note 24, at 426).
117. Id. at 2764 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 2766 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2767 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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herently distinctive test. Furthermore, they suggest the Court's
implicit adoption
of the doctrine of "secondary meaning. in the
' 121
making."
A. Application of the Inherently Distinctive Test
to Trade Dress Protection
In Two Pesos, the Court brought trade dress within the realm of
trademark protection by holding that section 43(a) protects trade
22
dress that has attained the status of an unregistered trademark.
Specifically, the Court held that the inherently distinctive test applies to trade dress cases. 123 However, in reaching this conclusion,
the Court failed to recognize the fundamental differences between
trademark and trade dress. Determining whether a word or symbol is inherently distinctive may be relatively easy; 124 it is more
difficult, however, to reach this conclusion when the inherently distinctive test is applied to a trade dress, such as a restaurant's decor.
Although some courts apply the same standards to evaluate the
inherent distinctiveness of a trade dress that they would apply to a
nonetheless based on subjective rather
trademark, 125 such tests1 are
26
than empirical findings.

121. The judge-made doctrine of "secondary meaning in the making" establishes
"that a firm that is making efforts to create a secondary meaning, but has not yet succeeded, should be protected as against a competitor who knowingly rushes in to market a
product under a similar mark." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 15:21[2], at 15-83.
Secondary meaning in the making derives support from the analogous "second comer"
doctrine which states:
A senior user in possession of a distinctive mark has a right not to have a second comer intentionally cause a likelihood of confusion between two marks in
an attempt to exploit the reputation of the senior user's mark, since this would
deprive the first user of control over its reputation and goodwill.
Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 1985).
122. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760.
123. Id. at 2761.
124. The test generally applied to determine whether a mark is inherently distinctive
is whether the design is unique and not a basic shape or a mere refinement of the ornamentation normally found on a type of product. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Suave
Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. BarWell Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1977) (trademark case)).
125. See, e.g.,
Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (looking at elements such as the color of the packaging, the color of the liquid, and
the use of a clear rather than an opaque bottle to determine whether an inherently distinctive trade dress was created).
126. As one commentator has noted:
To say that the overall design of a useful article is 'inherently distinctive' of a
particular source just by examining it and perhaps dissecting it, seems to me an
impermissible exercise of intuitive judging. It substitutes an impression that the
design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the proofs of
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In addition, by recognizing the similar treatment afforded registered and unregistered trademarks, the Court failed to differentiate
between the common law underpinnings of trade dress and the
statutory requirements of trademark registration. For example, a
firm may register its trademark on the Principal Register without a
showing of secondary meaning if the trademark is inherently distinctive. 27 As soon as the trademark is registered, the firm provides the world with notice: competitors may consult the public
register to avoid using a confusingly similar mark. 28 In contrast,
trade dress usually remains unregistered.1 29 It is only through its
use and exploitation over time that the appearance of the product
and its accumulated goodwill becomes associated with its source of
origin. Because this association provides the only notice to competitors of the proprietary nature of a trade dress, goodwill or reputation is the most important aspect of trade dress protection.
Distinctive appearance is merely one element of trade dress protection; it is not a substitute for secondary meaning.
B.

The Importance of Proving Secondary Meaning

Because they claim it is too difficult and costly to prove, most
courts reject the need for proof of secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress. 130 The Supreme Court in Two Pesos
also used this reasoning when it indicated that requiring proof of
association with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add up to a showing
of secondary meaning.
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341, 1380
(1987).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
128. According to one commentator:
Registration on the Principal Register requires submission of an application and
fee to the United States Patent & Trademark Office and a mark that: (1) meets
the Lanham Act definition of trademark; (2) is in actual use in interstate commerce; (3) is 'affixed' to the goods; and (4) is not barred from registration by
Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
William F. Gaske, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an Alternative to
Secondary Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1123, 1124 n.6 (1989) (quoting 1 McCARTHY, supra note 13, § 19:6, at 884-85).
129. Although trade dress may be registered on both the Principal and Supplemental
Register if it meets the requirements of trademark registration, it often remains unregistered "because the trade dress contains functional features or was not originally -intended
to identify the source." Id. at 1124.
130. For example, one must put forth the following evidence in order to prove secondary meaning: advertising expenditures, consumer surveys, sales success, unsolicited media coverage, attempts to plagiarize the mark, and length and exclusivity of use.
Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985). In analyzing whether a trade dress has acquired secondary meaning, "no one source is crucial and
every type of evidence need not be produced." Id.
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secondary meaning would have anticompetitive
effects by creating
131
burdens on the start-up of small businesses.
However, the Court failed to recognize that without proof of
secondary meaning for trade dress, a second comer in the market
receives no notice that another firm is currently using the nonverbal symbol, whether or not it is inherently distinctive. In addition,
secondary meaning carries a different significance for nonverbal
symbols as opposed to verbal symbols. Verbal symbols contain
meanings in themselves. 3 2 Therefore, it is only when a subsequent
meaning becomes attached to a verbal symbol and becomes its primary or dominant meaning in the market that the verbal symbol
has acquired a secondary meaning. 133 However, for a nonverbal
symbol to attain a secondary meaning, it must become associated
with the source of the goods in consumers' 34
minds, thereby achieving a trademark function of identification.
Thus, contrary to the Court's opinion, requiring secondary
meaning for product and package design does not foster unfair
competition but instead properly restricts protection to only those
aspects of a product that have become associated with the source.
This limits the monopoly rights granted under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act by leaving in the public domain
product features that
35
product.'
a
of
source
the
identify
not
do
The result of not requiring secondary meaning is that the market
is left with a broad, over-encompassing test, unlimited by time,
scope, or geographic area. By implicitly approving the doctrine of
"secondary meaning in the making,"1 36 the Court has opened the
door for manufacturers who are first in the market with an unregis131. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761 (rejecting the addition of a secondary meaning
requirement for inherently distinctive trade dress).
132. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 cmt. b (1938). Section 716 is no longer a part
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. In the introductory note to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the editors explained that after the decision was made to
include the section in the Restatement, "the influence of Tort law has continued to decrease, so that it is now largely of historical interest and the law of Unfair Competition
and Trade Regulation is no more dependent upon Tort law than it is on many other
general fields of the law."
133. Id.
134. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 15:2, at 521.
135.

The Seventh Circuit has observed that monopolies must be restrained in order to

preserve competition and consumer choices: "Because trademarks do not have a fixed
time limit like copyrights and patents, other and vaguer methods are used to cut them off
at the point where their value as information about product origin is exceeded by their
cost in impeding competition." W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 347 (7th
Cir. 1985).
136. For a definition of "secondary meaning in the making" see supra note 121.
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tered trade dress to limit rather than foster competition. Under
this theory, any intentional copying of a product's distinctive trade
dress is persuasive, if not conclusive evidence, of the consumer recognition and goodwill of a product. Thus, a manufacturer may
limit another's use of a trade dress in an entirely different market
area by proving that the second manufacturer intentionally copied
his trade dress. 137 Commentators frequently reject this theory as
inimical to a primary purpose of the Lanham Act, which is to protect only those designations associated with the origin of a product.1 38 This doctrine not only places too much emphasis on a
defendant's subjective state of mind, a test not used since the common law action of passing off, but it also wrongfully entitles a manufacturer to a monopoly in that trade dress.
The Court dictates this approach on the premise that a trade
dress, like a trademark, is capable of serving as a "representation
or designation" of source under section 43(a) because there are an
infinite variety of ways to package a product. 139 However, this
premise is flawed."40 Unlike trademarks, which use words or symbols, the possible combinations of product packaging are limited,
both by cost and functionality. 141 Therefore, rather than being
consistent with the purpose of section 43(a) to foster competition
and protect a product's goodwill, the Court's interpretation effectively limits the range of product and packaging designs available
137. See Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(finding a likelihood of confusion between a beverage dispenser designed to be a replica of
a 1920s era gasoline pump and a similarly designed gumball machine and aquarium). In
Two Pesos, despite the fact that Taco Cabana's trade dress had not acquired secondary
meaning, the Supreme Court prohibited Two Pesos from using the trade dress in market
areas where Taco Cabana had not yet even ventured. This implies that the Court relied
on the fact that Two Pesos intentionally appropriated Taco Cabana's inherently distinctive trade dress as evidence of the consumer recognition and goodwill of Taco Cabana's
restaurant.
138. See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Concord Beverage Co., 629 F. Supp. 200, 211 (3d Cir.
1985). The doctrine of "secondary meaning in the making" also conflicts with the common law rule of unfair competition. See also Carter, supra note 28, at 765-767 (claiming
that the common law rule limits an action for unfair competition to cases in which the
junior user is competing with the senior user and has imitated the mark in order to trade
on the senior user's goodwill).
139. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2767 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. See Carter, supra note 28, at 770 (arguing that "some words and symbols are
inherently cheaper information economizers than others ... some marks are better than
others").
141. See Brief of Private Label Manufacturer's Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at *38, Two
Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (No. 91-971) (availablein LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file) (arguing that an extension of trade dress protection would limit the
range of product and packaging design to the detriment of private label manufacturers).
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for other manufacturers to compete effectively in the market. 42
While such a test may reduce the "likelihood of confusion" among
consumers of competing products, it significantly limits their
choices.
V.

IMPACT

The Two Pesos opinion failed to define inherently distinctive
trade dress. Additionally, it failed to define how much copying of
a trade dress constitutes infringement. As a result, trial courts are
left to decide these questions without Supreme Court guidance.
Because the inherently distinctive test is much easier to apply,
plaintiffs will likely go to court more often and will settle cases less
often. The test requires only that one prove that one's trade dress
is either arbitrary, suggestive, or fanciful. According to the Court
in Two Pesos, virtually any combination of color and design will be
inherently distinctive and protectable under section 43(a) at the
moment its user introduces the product into the market. Because
of the time and cost involved, requiring proof of secondary meaning formerly acted as a deterrent to frivolous suits. However, after
Two Pesos, nothing remains to restrain users of trade dress from
bringing law suits.
While an inherently distinctive test makes it easier for a plaintiff
to prove his or her case, it places an unreasonable burden on competitors. Because competitors can look to no public register to determine whether a trade dress is already being used in the
marketplace, they must attempt to determine in advance whether a
product's design or packaging is inherently distinctive.
In addition, because trade dress protection extends to the overall
packaging or design of a product, even if a product's individual
components are not protectable, manufacturers of patentable designs will likely seek protection under section 43(a) rather than
under copyright or patent law. In comparison to copyright protection, which generally lasts only for the life of an author plus fifty
years, 43 and patent protection, which lasts fourteen years,' 44 trade
dress protection may extend indefinitely.' 4 The Supreme Court's
holding in Two Pesos, requiring only that a product be inherently
distinctive, expands trade dress protection and grants a perpetual
142. Id.
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1977).
144. See id. § 173.
145. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 6:3, at 127 (noting that "rights in a trademark continue for as long as the mark is used to identify and distinguish").
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monopoly to the first user of a product's design. Unfortunately,
this holding may result in courts granting protection for product
designs that section 43(a) was never intended to protect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict over
whether the scope of the Lanham Act extends to inherently distinctive trade dress that has not acquired secondary meaning in the
marketplace. The Supreme Court's decision broadens the reach of
the Lanham Act and expands a plaintiff's case. Because of the low
threshold required to acquire trade dress protection, first users of a
trade dress will seek judicial protection, even when the trade dress
consists merely of some light fixtures and a few murals on the wall.
Moreover, provided that the light fixtures and murals taken together are inherently distinctive, these first users will receive this
protection. The relevance of this issue may soon be brought to
light as more plaintiffs test the issue of what constitutes inherently
distinctive trade dress and as they seek protection for items of intellectual property that Congress never meant to include within the
ambit of section 43(a).
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